The U.S. war in Afghanistan started off with rousing optimism in the fall of 2001, but by the end of the decade has devolved into a quagmire for U. S. troops and potential disaster for the Afghan people. For all its twists and turns, it has had one striking constant—nearly every decision made by Western policymakers and Afghan leaders in fighting it has been the wrong one.
. . . It is a mind-numbing tale of failure that has brought the United States and NATO to a painful decision point about the war in Afghanistan. They must realize that it is time to move beyond the U.S. military’s dreams of winning in Afghanistan and focus instead on best preparing the country for a partial drawdown of U.S. troops and a shift in mission from population-centric counter- insurgency to counter-terrorism and stabilization.
. . . After more than nine years of war, few good options remain on the table. The Taliban insurgency has gained momentum across the country at the same time that falling support for the war at home will constrain the president’s ability to sustain a long-term military commitment.
“Winning” in Afghanistan is no longer in the cards, if it ever was. Instead, the president and his advisers must choose from a set of worst-case scenarios. Picking the least worse one—which protects U.S. interests while, one hopes, stabilizing Afghanistan—must be the focus of U.S. policy going forward. That begins with laying the groundwork for a political strategy to spur reconciliation between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents.
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